Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups
Metadata only
Date
2011Type
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
Altmetrics
Abstract
We study whether differences in the propensity of actual leaders to enforce cooperation by punishing group members as a third party in a social dilemma game can explain the variation in the performance of these groups in managing their forest commons. The results show that leader punishment motives vary from pure self-regarding and egalitarian to efficiency concerns and even anti-social motives. We find a significant positive association between commons management outcomes, measured by the average number of young trees per hectare, and leaders who reveal a concern for equality and efficiency in the experiment. For anti-social leaders, the association is negative and significant. A detailed empirical analysis suggests that omitted variables and reverse causality are not driving these results, corroborating a causal interpretation of these associations. Our results highlight the importance of leaders in collective action, emphasizing the significant role of leaders’ other-regarding motives for cooperation outcomes. Show more
Publication status
unpublishedPublisher
ETH ZürichSubject
Leadership; Other-regarding preferences; Third-party punishment; Anti-social punishment; Conditional cooperation; Common property resourcesOrganisational unit
03728 - Engel, Stefanie (ehemalig)
More
Show all metadata
ETH Bibliography
yes
Altmetrics