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Author
Date
2008-07Type
- Working Paper
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yes
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Abstract
In a standard partial equilibrium model of resource depletion, this paper characterizes and examines the solution to the optimal taxation problem when extraction is monopolistic. The main result is that the family of subgame perfect efficiency-inducing tax/subsidy schemes may include some strict tax policies. This illustrates how the static trade-off between inducing efficiency and raising tax revenues in the presence of market power is relaxed under exhaustibility. Show more
Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-005666524Publication status
publishedJournal / series
Economics Working Paper SeriesVolume
Publisher
ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)Subject
Exhaustible resources; Imperfect competition; Optimal taxationOrganisational unit
03635 - Bretschger, Lucas (emeritus) / Bretschger, Lucas (emeritus)
02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.
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Is previous version of: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/36250
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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