Metadata only
Date
2011-02Type
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
no
Altmetrics
Abstract
We study a differentiated product market in which an investor initially owns a controlling stake in one of two competing firms and may acquire a non-controlling or a controlling stake in a competitor, either directly using her own assets, or indirectly via the controlled firm. While industry profits are maximized within a symmetric two product monopoly, the investor attains this only in exceptional cases. Instead, she sometimes acquires a non-controlling stake. Or she invests asymmetrically rather than pursuing a full takeover if she acquires a controlling one. Generally, she invests indirectly if she only wants to affect the product market outcome, and directly if acquiring shares is profitable per se. Show more
Publication status
publishedJournal / series
CEPR Discussion PapersPages / Article No.
Publisher
Centre for Economic Policy ResearchSubject
Differentiated products; Private benefits of control; Separation of ownership and controlOrganisational unit
03436 - Hertig, Gérard (emeritus)
03795 - Bechtold, Stefan / Bechtold, Stefan
More
Show all metadata
ETH Bibliography
no
Altmetrics