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Author
Date
2004-07Type
- Conference Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
Verkehrsteilnehmer wissen oft sehr genau, dass ihr Verhalten nicht dem allgemeinen Interesse entspricht, fühlen sich aber trotzdem gerechtfertigt, da sie ihr Handeln als Teil ihrer Konsumentenfreiheit verstehen. Dieses Dilemma findet seinen Widerhall in den aktuellen Schwierigkeiten der westlichen Staaten einen angemessenen Ordnungsrahmen für ihre grossen Infrastrukturen zu definieren: alles vom staatlichem Monopol bis zu unregulierten Märkten diskutiert und realisiert.
Diese Antrittsvorlesung diskutiert dieses Dilemma vor dem Hintergrund eines kurzen historischen Rückblicks auf die Evolution der Infrastrukturen und der Verkehrsplanung. Vier Themen werden gründlicher betrachtet: die Idee des Systemoptimums und des Nutzergleichgewichts. Der private Betrieb von Netzen und die Rechtfertigung der gesellschaftlichen Investition in Infrastrukturen. Show more
Travellers are very often acutely aware that their behaviour does not contribute to the common good, but still feel justified in their behaviour as the expression of their consumer sovereignty. This dilemma is mirrored in the recent difficulties of industrialised countries to define the proper regulatory framework for their big network infrastructures: everything between state-run monopoly and unregulated markets is discussed and implemented.
The paper discusses this dilemma against a brief historical review of the evolution of the networks and of transport planning. The further discussion is structured by the interactions between the possible roles of the traveller (customer or citizen) and the regulatory framework adopted for the infrastructures (private or public goods).
The combination customer/public good leads to the classic tragedy of common situation, as the use of the infrastructure is not properly priced. In the transport case, this can be illustrated by the difference between user and system optimum, which are introduced and discussed. Methods to obtain the system optimum for the citizen/public good combination are suggested in the following section: time penalties or rations. In the combination of customer/private good the operator will focus on the service levels offered, while ignoring the rest, while in the citizen/private good situation society has to define the way in which the relevant minimum service standards are to be fixed and paid for. Methods for this and by implication for further public investment in infrastructures is discussed in the final
section.
Areas for further work are identified in the conclusions. Show more
Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000023570Publication status
publishedJournal / series
Arbeitsberichte Verkehrs- und RaumplanungVolume
Publisher
IVT, ETH ZürichEvent
Subject
Verkehrsnachfrage; Steuerung; Rationierung; Öffentliche Güter; Institut für Verkehrsplanung und Transportsysteme; ETH Zürich; Travel demand; management; rationing; public goods; tragedy of the common; Institute for Transport Planning and SystemsOrganisational unit
03521 - Axhausen, Kay W. (emeritus) / Axhausen, Kay W. (emeritus)
02226 - NSL - Netzwerk Stadt und Landschaft / NSL - Network City and Landscape
02655 - Netzwerk Stadt u. Landschaft ARCH u BAUG / Network City and Landscape ARCH and BAUG
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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